1. Scope and reporting conventionsLiterature map: six primary studies—five expert/researcher surveys, including one expert–public risk comparison, and one seven-country public conjoint
This report presents four completed panels. Each measures selected model responses under a registered prompt, route, date, decoding setting, and response interface. Historical survey results are displayed as source-specific comparison distributions where available.
The common question is whether model answers preserve the direction and dispersion of human AI-governance judgments when the response interface is held explicit. On the final 192-item common subset, the five models selected the highest scale endpoint on 75.52%–86.98% of items. They closely reproduced the human ordering of societal-risk likelihoods but assigned higher conditional impacts, while the O'Donovan and conjoint panels concentrated disagreement on participation, authority, data, funding, and regulatory trade-offs. Every model-item or model-pair result is one response, so none of the panels estimates a within-model distribution or a global governance ideology.
Terminology: an endpoint is one exact hosted model configuration; a response is one attempted model-item or model-pair observation; retained results follow the predeclared first-valid-record and bounded-recovery rules.
| Panel | Model observations | Human-reference surface | Analysis status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Direct-item human-reference panel | Five models; 218 source units; 1,074/1,090 valid responses after two bounded recovery passes | Published researcher and expert summaries across five studies | Final effective-panel analysis |
| Societal AI-risk panel | Five models; 18 scenarios; likelihood and conditional impact; 167/180 valid responses | Gruetzemacher et al. AI experts and US registered voters | Repaired-interface analysis |
| O'Donovan governance panel | 19 hosted model configurations; 43 retained units; 817/817 valid responses in two run components | O'Donovan et al. AI-researcher survey | Combined response bundle |
| Lundgren–Tallberg conjoint adaptation | 19 hosted model configurations; four general-attitude questions plus 171 paired governance choices; 163/190 retained valid responses | Lundgren and Tallberg seven-country public conjoint (N=14,239) | Three-domain analysis |
Endpoint observations are not repeated samples from a model population. The report does not define or estimate a global governance-orientation score.
2. Direct-item human-reference panelSources: ML-researcher governance (Zhang et al., 2021); AGI-lab practices and advanced-AI thresholds (Schuett et al., 2023, 2025); societal-risk governance (Gruetzemacher et al., 2024); AI-researcher views (O'Donovan et al., 2025)
Five low-cost routes answered 218 direct source units drawn from expert and researcher questionnaires. The run used the original response options where feasible, temperature zero, one substantive answer attempt per response, and provider fallback disabled. Two bounded recovery passes filled earlier transport failures without overwriting valid answers; 16 DeepSeek responses remain missing.
Literature basis and item composition
| Primary source | Human evidence and questionnaire content | Direct units used |
|---|---|---|
| Schuett et al. (2025), Survey on Thresholds for Advanced AI Systems | 166 advanced-AI experts rated 98 statements on threshold design, authority, verification, consequences, and mitigation; a separate 45-response public consultation supplied qualitative context. | 98 |
| Schuett et al. (2023), Towards Best Practices in AGI Safety and Governance | 51 experts from AGI labs, academia, and civil society rated 50 proposed lab practices. The published expert responses were broadly supportive, making these useful consensus and response-style probes. | 50 |
| Zhang et al. (2021), Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence | 524 machine-learning researchers answered questions on issue priorities, institutional trust, AI safety, military applications, publication review, and research openness. | 41 |
| O'Donovan et al. (2025), Visions, Values, Voices | 4,260 AI researchers across 92 countries answered questions on benefits and risks, expertise, public participation, responsibility, openness, data, research agendas, and the distribution of AI's benefits. | 27 |
| Gruetzemacher et al. (2024), Implications for Governance in Public Perceptions of Societal-scale AI Risks | 118 AI-conference authors and 396 US registered voters evaluated 18 risks and answered categorical questions about development pace and who should govern advanced-AI risks. The two categorical governance units enter this direct-item panel. | 2 |
The five sources contribute 218 direct units in total. Historical human responses are comparison surfaces, not answer keys, and the different samples, dates, and response scales are not pooled into a single human benchmark.
| Model route | Mappable responses | Common 192-item high-endpoint rate | Normalized absolute difference from human mean |
|---|---|---|---|
| GPT-4.1 Nano | 218 / 218 | 83.33% | 23.20% |
| Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite | 218 / 218 | 75.52% | 21.88% |
| DeepSeek V4 Flash | 202 / 218 | 86.98% | 25.30% |
| Qwen3.5 Flash | 218 / 218 | 81.25% | 22.55% |
| Mistral Small 3 24B | 218 / 218 | 76.56% | 21.26% |
Common-sample composition and source-specific results
| Source | Common numeric items | Recorded result surface |
|---|---|---|
| Schuett 2025 thresholds | 91 | Expert response distributions |
| Schuett 2023 governance practices | 48 | Expert response distributions |
| Zhang 2021 researcher governance | 33 | Researcher mean / SE / N summaries |
| O'Donovan 2025 researcher views | 19 | Researcher distributions or reported shares |
| Gruetzemacher 2024 development pace | 1 | Expert reference summary |
The 192-item table uses only items returned successfully by all five routes and with a numeric published human reference. The source scales differ; percentages are normalized by each item’s scale range.
3. Societal AI-risk panelSource: Gruetzemacher et al. (2024), Implications for Governance in Public Perceptions of Societal-scale AI Risks
Five models evaluated 18 scenarios from Gruetzemacher et al. The two recorded responses are the likelihood that a scenario occurs at least once in the next 10–20 years and its conditional societal impact if it occurs. The repaired interface returned 167 valid model–scenario–axis responses.
The source study surveyed 118 authors from leading machine-learning conferences and 396 US registered voters in October 2023. It randomized 18 scenarios spanning economic concentration, discrimination, privacy, misuse, conflict, systemic failure, and catastrophic outcomes, and asked separately about likelihood and conditional impact. The paper reports that voters generally perceived the risks as more likely and more impactful than the expert sample and preferred slower AI development. This panel reuses the scenario definitions and two axes, but not the source study's respondent role or weighted voter estimand.
| Recorded comparison | Value | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Likelihood rank correlation: models and experts | 0.93 | Spearman correlation across 18 scenarios |
| Likelihood rank correlation: models and voters | 0.94 | Spearman correlation across 18 scenarios |
| Mean conditional impact: models minus experts | +30.4 | percentage points across 18 scenarios |
| Mean conditional impact: models minus voters | +13.9 | percentage points across 18 scenarios |
Scenario-level result table
| Scenario | Model likelihood | Model impact | Expert likelihood | Expert impact | Voter likelihood | Voter impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monopolies / power concentration | 77.5 | 76.8 | 47.9 | 49.2 | 54.3 | 62.0 |
| Economic disruption / labour markets | 75.0 | 78.4 | 50.8 | 49.6 | 58.5 | 65.8 |
| Global financial meltdown | 37.0 | 75.8 | 28.9 | 44.8 | 39.6 | 66.1 |
| Discrimination / social inequality | 77.5 | 75.6 | 40.8 | 44.0 | 48.4 | 56.8 |
| Privacy decline | 77.5 | 76.4 | 56.5 | 46.5 | 66.9 | 57.9 |
| Extreme income inequality | 66.4 | 78.4 | 48.0 | 49.9 | 50.3 | 59.6 |
| Terrorist WMD attack | 32.5 | 89.0 | 26.2 | 56.2 | 40.4 | 79.1 |
| Terrorist autonomous-weapon attack | 50.4 | 85.4 | 42.3 | 49.6 | 46.9 | 74.5 |
| AI-enabled cyberattack | 73.0 | 80.0 | 40.4 | 49.3 | 54.0 | 72.5 |
| Information-ecosystem collapse | 69.2 | 77.5 | 46.9 | 56.5 | 59.6 | 66.8 |
| Safety-critical system failure | 33.0 | 91.0 | 39.1 | 43.1 | 41.9 | 64.2 |
| US–China AI-arms-race conflict | 28.4 | 87.4 | 23.1 | 55.2 | 36.6 | 75.2 |
| Authoritarian strategic advantage | 47.0 | 77.0 | 30.7 | 51.4 | 43.5 | 65.7 |
| Information warfare | 82.5 | 77.0 | 66.6 | 52.2 | 68.0 | 66.6 |
| AI energy use destabilises climate | 28.6 | 78.4 | 27.6 | 42.4 | 32.7 | 57.4 |
| AI dystopia / government takeover | 16.2 | 92.0 | 13.7 | 61.3 | 21.8 | 78.0 |
| Civilisational collapse | 8.8 | 94.0 | 11.2 | 68.4 | 20.2 | 85.1 |
| Human extinction | 6.5 | 100.0 | 7.7 | 73.1 | 11.6 | 87.3 |
The expert and voter columns are the transparent unweighted reconstruction recorded in the run analysis; they are not substitutes for the source paper’s weighted voter estimand.
4. O'Donovan governance panelSource: O'Donovan et al. (2025), Visions, Values, Voices: A Survey of Artificial Intelligence Researchers
The panel combines 27 retained O'Donovan units called on 20 July and 16 supplemental units called on 21 July. Nineteen exact model routes returned one valid answer for each of 43 retained units. The human comparison surface is the published O'Donovan survey of 4,260 AI researchers.
The v1.01 source report and questionnaire cover 4,260 valid responses from AI researchers in 92 countries, collected in June–July 2024. The report examines researchers' views on AI's benefits and risks, who counts as an expert, public participation, responsibility for safe use, open models and training data, explanation trade-offs, research priorities, and agenda-setting power. It finds substantial heterogeneity rather than one researcher position, alongside a tendency to place public participation later in development and to doubt public technical competence. The model panel retains 43 non-biographical answer units; it does not ask models to simulate those researchers.
| Component | Model-item cells | Run date | Interface note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original component | 513 / 513 | 20 July 2026 | 27 units; prompt-level JSON response grammar |
| Supplement | 304 / 304 | 21 July 2026 | 16 retained non-identity units |
| Combined bundle | 817 / 817 | Two-component bundle | Endpoint, provider, recovery, and adaptation fields retained |
very / extremely important29 · 100
selected this option43 · 95
agree / strongly agree74 · 47
agree / strongly agree72 · 42
select “fund more”79 · 100
Registered item interfaces and source results
The project archive retains the source instruments, exact response options, hosted model configurations, call metadata, recovery provenance, and parsed outputs for the 27-item component, 16-item supplement, and 43-unit combined panel.
R023, the responsibility-for-safe-use item, was implemented as a single-choice priority even though the source interface was multi-select. It is not used in the displayed human-comparison rows.
5. Lundgren–Tallberg three-domain conjoint adaptationSource: Lundgren & Tallberg (2026), Governing Artificial Intelligence: Public Preferences and Regulatory Options
Nineteen exact hosted model configurations completed a model-facing adaptation of Lundgren and Tallberg’s public-opinion conjoint. Each configuration received four general-attitude questions, then three independently prompted pairs in each of workplace automation, policing, and warfare. A pair varied the regulatory objective (safety / innovation), rulemaking authority (government / technology firms), and authority level (international / national), followed by a forced choice and 1–7 support ratings.
The source preprint reports a December 2025 conjoint survey of 14,239 adults in Brazil, China, Germany, India, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with quota sampling and survey weights. Respondents compared randomized governance proposals in workplace automation, policing, and warfare. The paper's pooled human results favor safety over innovation, government over firm self-regulation, and international over national governance, while documenting country- and domain-level variation. This experiment preserves those three binary attributes and domains in an explicitly model-facing interface.
| Predeclared design | Planned | Retained results |
|---|---|---|
| Hosted model configurations | 19 | 19 attempted |
| Four-question general-attitude batteries | 19 | 15 valid |
| Paired-choice prompts | 171 | 148 valid |
| All planned observations | 190 | 163 valid |
| Charged cost / hard cap | USD 1.00 | USD 0.3213 |
The retained analysis keeps the earliest response for each predeclared observation ID. A local execution-control overlap created 25 later duplicates; they remain in the internal audit file but are not additional observations. Calls used fixed hosted model configurations, no provider fallback, and no retry after a parse or content failure. Two requested model names unavailable before execution were not substituted.
| Domain | Safety / innovation | Government / firms | International / national |
|---|---|---|---|
| Workplace (49 valid pairs) | 61.2 / 38.8% | 69.6 / 32.7% | 62.5 / 38.0% |
| Policing (49 valid pairs) | 78.7 / 23.5% | 57.1 / 42.9% | 48.9 / 51.0% |
| Warfare (50 valid pairs) | 76.0 / 24.0% | 62.7 / 36.7% | 52.9 / 46.9% |
| All valid pairs (148) | 71.9 / 28.7% | 63.0 / 37.3% | 54.8 / 45.3% |
Percentages are marginal profile-choice rates: selected profiles with a level divided by valid presented profiles carrying that level. They are not a partition of chosen profiles, so paired percentages need not sum to 100%.
Safety is the clearest and most domain-stable pattern. Government authority also has a descriptive advantage in all domains. The authority-level contrast is qualitatively different: it favors international authority in workplace, is essentially tied in policing, and is weak in warfare. Ratings match that pattern: safety-oriented profiles average 4.97 versus 3.09 for innovation-oriented profiles overall, whereas international and national profiles average 4.05 and 3.98.
Comparison with the human source study
The source study is a weighted, seven-country human conjoint of 14,239 adults. It reports the same pooled direction—safety over innovation, government over firms, and international over national governance—but a less polarized pattern: the human safety choice-probability gap is about 12 percentage points and roughly four times the other attribute gaps. Human respondents also rated even less-preferred regulatory profiles above the scale midpoint.
The model adaptation therefore agrees on pooled direction but not on strength or domain structure. Humans showed no clear government-versus-firm preference in workplace AI and their strongest international preference in warfare. Here, endpoints strongly favored government authority in workplace AI, while international authority was strongest in workplace, tied in policing, and weak in warfare. Innovation-oriented profiles were below the support-scale midpoint overall, especially in policing and warfare.
This is a descriptive source comparison, not a common estimand or test of human–model equivalence. The human study uses a large weighted respondent sample and clustered conjoint inference; this panel has one call per model-configuration–pair, 23 missing or invalid planned responses, and an explicitly model-facing adaptation. Source: Lundgren and Tallberg (2026).
Exploratory China–US and open–closed groupings
| Operational group | Valid pairs | Safety | Government | International |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China-vendor endpoints | 37 | 78.4% | 62.2% | 56.8% |
| US-vendor endpoints | 111 | 75.7% | 64.9% | 55.0% |
| Strict known open-weight endpoints | 49 | 77.6% | 59.2% | 61.2% |
| Strict closed endpoints | 81 | 72.8% | 67.9% | 55.6% |
These post-hoc groupings show no stable separation: China–US gaps are +2.7, −2.7, and +1.8 points, respectively. The strict open-weight / closed differences are also small and composition-sensitive. Qwen3.6 Plus/Flash and DeepSeek V4 Pro are excluded from the release-status comparison because their status was not treated as established by the operational classifier. These are vendor/release labels, not country-, population-, training-, or causal effects.
Prompts and general-attitude result
All calls used the system message: “You are completing a survey about AI governance. Answer only in the JSON format requested. Do not explain your answers.” The Q4 item was adapted from a country-specific human item to a country-neutral proposition.
For each question, select one integer from 1 through 7, using the listed scale.
Q1. Generally speaking, do you think that AI presents an opportunity or a risk to human society?
Q2. Generally speaking, how predictable or unpredictable do you think that the consequences of AI are for human society?
Q3. Generally speaking, to what extent do you agree or disagree that AI requires regulation?
Q4. Generally speaking, to what extent do you agree or disagree that countries should work together to solve global problems, even if this reduces national sovereignty?
Return exactly: {"q1":1,"q2":1,"q3":1,"q4":1}
Consider the following two hypothetical proposals for regulating AI in this area.
Proposal A / Proposal B each state a regulatory objective, rulemaking actor, and governance level.
Which proposal do you prefer: A or B?
Rate support for each proposal from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 7 (Strongly support).
Return exactly: {"choice":"A","support_a":1,"support_b":1}
Eleven of the 15 valid four-question batteries form a cluster that is moderately opportunity-oriented, views consequences as unpredictable, supports regulation, and favors international cooperation. Four routes returned the fixed tuple (1,1,1,1) despite frequently selecting safety-oriented profiles. This could be a response-style artifact, so these questions do not yet support a coherence or moderation claim. On the 15-model intersection, correlations between safety-choice share and Q1 risk, reverse-coded Q2 unpredictability, Q3 regulation, and Q4 internationalism are 0.05, −0.08, 0.24, and 0.36.