GovOrient: four completed experimental panels

Methods and descriptive results from a human-reference survey panel, a societal-risk panel, an AI-governance survey panel, and a three-domain governance conjoint adaptation.

English model responses · completed runs from 18–22 July 2026 · results are reported by experiment and not pooled
Linen Yu · last updated 23 July 2026

1. Scope and reporting conventionsLiterature map: six primary studies—five expert/researcher surveys, including one expert–public risk comparison, and one seven-country public conjoint

This report presents four completed panels. Each measures selected model responses under a registered prompt, route, date, decoding setting, and response interface. Historical survey results are displayed as source-specific comparison distributions where available.

The common question is whether model answers preserve the direction and dispersion of human AI-governance judgments when the response interface is held explicit. On the final 192-item common subset, the five models selected the highest scale endpoint on 75.52%–86.98% of items. They closely reproduced the human ordering of societal-risk likelihoods but assigned higher conditional impacts, while the O'Donovan and conjoint panels concentrated disagreement on participation, authority, data, funding, and regulatory trade-offs. Every model-item or model-pair result is one response, so none of the panels estimates a within-model distribution or a global governance ideology.

Terminology: an endpoint is one exact hosted model configuration; a response is one attempted model-item or model-pair observation; retained results follow the predeclared first-valid-record and bounded-recovery rules.

PanelModel observationsHuman-reference surfaceAnalysis status
Direct-item human-reference panelFive models; 218 source units; 1,074/1,090 valid responses after two bounded recovery passesPublished researcher and expert summaries across five studiesFinal effective-panel analysis
Societal AI-risk panelFive models; 18 scenarios; likelihood and conditional impact; 167/180 valid responsesGruetzemacher et al. AI experts and US registered votersRepaired-interface analysis
O'Donovan governance panel19 hosted model configurations; 43 retained units; 817/817 valid responses in two run componentsO'Donovan et al. AI-researcher surveyCombined response bundle
Lundgren–Tallberg conjoint adaptation19 hosted model configurations; four general-attitude questions plus 171 paired governance choices; 163/190 retained valid responsesLundgren and Tallberg seven-country public conjoint (N=14,239)Three-domain analysis

Endpoint observations are not repeated samples from a model population. The report does not define or estimate a global governance-orientation score.

2. Direct-item human-reference panelSources: ML-researcher governance (Zhang et al., 2021); AGI-lab practices and advanced-AI thresholds (Schuett et al., 2023, 2025); societal-risk governance (Gruetzemacher et al., 2024); AI-researcher views (O'Donovan et al., 2025)

Five low-cost routes answered 218 direct source units drawn from expert and researcher questionnaires. The run used the original response options where feasible, temperature zero, one substantive answer attempt per response, and provider fallback disabled. Two bounded recovery passes filled earlier transport failures without overwriting valid answers; 16 DeepSeek responses remain missing.

Literature basis and item composition
Primary sourceHuman evidence and questionnaire contentDirect units used
Schuett et al. (2025), Survey on Thresholds for Advanced AI Systems166 advanced-AI experts rated 98 statements on threshold design, authority, verification, consequences, and mitigation; a separate 45-response public consultation supplied qualitative context.98
Schuett et al. (2023), Towards Best Practices in AGI Safety and Governance51 experts from AGI labs, academia, and civil society rated 50 proposed lab practices. The published expert responses were broadly supportive, making these useful consensus and response-style probes.50
Zhang et al. (2021), Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence524 machine-learning researchers answered questions on issue priorities, institutional trust, AI safety, military applications, publication review, and research openness.41
O'Donovan et al. (2025), Visions, Values, Voices4,260 AI researchers across 92 countries answered questions on benefits and risks, expertise, public participation, responsibility, openness, data, research agendas, and the distribution of AI's benefits.27
Gruetzemacher et al. (2024), Implications for Governance in Public Perceptions of Societal-scale AI Risks118 AI-conference authors and 396 US registered voters evaluated 18 risks and answered categorical questions about development pace and who should govern advanced-AI risks. The two categorical governance units enter this direct-item panel.2

The five sources contribute 218 direct units in total. Historical human responses are comparison surfaces, not answer keys, and the different samples, dates, and response scales are not pooled into a single human benchmark.

Model routeMappable responsesCommon 192-item high-endpoint rateNormalized absolute difference from human mean
GPT-4.1 Nano218 / 21883.33%23.20%
Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite218 / 21875.52%21.88%
DeepSeek V4 Flash202 / 21886.98%25.30%
Qwen3.5 Flash218 / 21881.25%22.55%
Mistral Small 3 24B218 / 21876.56%21.26%
GPT-4.1 Nano83.33%
Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite75.52%
DeepSeek V4 Flash86.98%
Qwen3.5 Flash81.25%
Mistral Small 3 24B76.56%
Figure 1. Share of selections at the highest endpoint on the final common set of 192 numerically comparable items. DeepSeek has 16 missing answers outside this common subset; the other four routes have full 218-item coverage. Source: final effective-panel analysis after recovery pass 2.
Common-sample composition and source-specific results
SourceCommon numeric itemsRecorded result surface
Schuett 2025 thresholds91Expert response distributions
Schuett 2023 governance practices48Expert response distributions
Zhang 2021 researcher governance33Researcher mean / SE / N summaries
O'Donovan 2025 researcher views19Researcher distributions or reported shares
Gruetzemacher 2024 development pace1Expert reference summary

The 192-item table uses only items returned successfully by all five routes and with a numeric published human reference. The source scales differ; percentages are normalized by each item’s scale range.

3. Societal AI-risk panelSource: Gruetzemacher et al. (2024), Implications for Governance in Public Perceptions of Societal-scale AI Risks

Five models evaluated 18 scenarios from Gruetzemacher et al. The two recorded responses are the likelihood that a scenario occurs at least once in the next 10–20 years and its conditional societal impact if it occurs. The repaired interface returned 167 valid model–scenario–axis responses.

The source study surveyed 118 authors from leading machine-learning conferences and 396 US registered voters in October 2023. It randomized 18 scenarios spanning economic concentration, discrimination, privacy, misuse, conflict, systemic failure, and catastrophic outcomes, and asked separately about likelihood and conditional impact. The paper reports that voters generally perceived the risks as more likely and more impactful than the expert sample and preferred slower AI development. This panel reuses the scenario definitions and two axes, but not the source study's respondent role or weighted voter estimand.

Model mean likelihood and conditional impact across eighteen societal AI-risk scenarios Each point is one scenario, plotted using the mean across four or five valid model responses for likelihood and impact. 0255075100 0255075100 Model mean likelihood (0–100)Model mean conditional impact (0–100) Concentration Economic disruption Financial meltdown Discrimination Privacy Inequality Terrorist WMD Autonomous weapons Cyberattack Information ecosystem Safety-system failure US–China conflict Authoritarian advantage Information warfare Climate destabilisation AI dystopia Civilisational collapse Extinction
Figure 2. Model mean likelihood and conditional impact for 18 source scenarios. Each coordinate averages four or five valid model responses. Scenario definitions and human comparison design come from Gruetzemacher et al. (2024); plotted model values come from the repaired-interface panel.
Recorded comparisonValueUnit
Likelihood rank correlation: models and experts0.93Spearman correlation across 18 scenarios
Likelihood rank correlation: models and voters0.94Spearman correlation across 18 scenarios
Mean conditional impact: models minus experts+30.4percentage points across 18 scenarios
Mean conditional impact: models minus voters+13.9percentage points across 18 scenarios
Scenario-level result table
ScenarioModel likelihoodModel impactExpert likelihoodExpert impactVoter likelihoodVoter impact
Monopolies / power concentration77.576.847.949.254.362.0
Economic disruption / labour markets75.078.450.849.658.565.8
Global financial meltdown37.075.828.944.839.666.1
Discrimination / social inequality77.575.640.844.048.456.8
Privacy decline77.576.456.546.566.957.9
Extreme income inequality66.478.448.049.950.359.6
Terrorist WMD attack32.589.026.256.240.479.1
Terrorist autonomous-weapon attack50.485.442.349.646.974.5
AI-enabled cyberattack73.080.040.449.354.072.5
Information-ecosystem collapse69.277.546.956.559.666.8
Safety-critical system failure33.091.039.143.141.964.2
US–China AI-arms-race conflict28.487.423.155.236.675.2
Authoritarian strategic advantage47.077.030.751.443.565.7
Information warfare82.577.066.652.268.066.6
AI energy use destabilises climate28.678.427.642.432.757.4
AI dystopia / government takeover16.292.013.761.321.878.0
Civilisational collapse8.894.011.268.420.285.1
Human extinction6.5100.07.773.111.687.3

The expert and voter columns are the transparent unweighted reconstruction recorded in the run analysis; they are not substitutes for the source paper’s weighted voter estimand.

4. O'Donovan governance panelSource: O'Donovan et al. (2025), Visions, Values, Voices: A Survey of Artificial Intelligence Researchers

The panel combines 27 retained O'Donovan units called on 20 July and 16 supplemental units called on 21 July. Nineteen exact model routes returned one valid answer for each of 43 retained units. The human comparison surface is the published O'Donovan survey of 4,260 AI researchers.

The v1.01 source report and questionnaire cover 4,260 valid responses from AI researchers in 92 countries, collected in June–July 2024. The report examines researchers' views on AI's benefits and risks, who counts as an expert, public participation, responsibility for safe use, open models and training data, explanation trade-offs, research priorities, and agenda-setting power. It finds substantial heterogeneity rather than one researcher position, alongside a tendency to place public participation later in development and to doubt public technical competence. The model panel retains 43 non-biographical answer units; it does not ask models to simulate those researchers.

ComponentModel-item cellsRun dateInterface note
Original component513 / 51320 July 202627 units; prompt-level JSON response grammar
Supplement304 / 30421 July 202616 retained non-identity units
Combined bundle817 / 817Two-component bundleEndpoint, provider, recovery, and adaptation fields retained
AI researchers19 model endpoints
Public involvement in developing AI
very / extremely important
29 · 100
Conditional explanation at some accuracy cost
selected this option
43 · 95
Industry has too much agenda-setting power
agree / strongly agree
74 · 47
Advanced models should be open-source
agree / strongly agree
72 · 42
Increase education AI funding
select “fund more”
79 · 100
0%50%100%human · model
Figure 3. Reported human AI-researcher shares and the share of 19 hosted model configurations selecting the named position. Human values are taken from Figures 22, 32, 33, and 34 of the O'Donovan et al. v1.01 report: public involvement (Figure 22), explanation–accuracy trade-off (Figure 32), industry agenda power and open source (Figure 33), and education funding (Figure 34). The education-funding item uses a model-facing current funding baseline and is therefore a directional comparison. Model shares come from the 43-unit combined panel.
Editorial topic grouping:low-conflict normative statementprocedure / participationauthority / allocation
AI should reflect human values0.000
Education funding0.000
Healthcare funding0.149
Explanation trade-off0.149
Public involvement in developing AI0.315
Unequal benefits0.209
Industry agenda power0.696
Training-data permission0.946
Military funding0.975
Policing/security funding0.975
Figure 4. Normalized entropy of 19 endpoint selections by item. Zero means all endpoints selected the same registered option; one is the maximum possible spread for that item’s option count. Funding and unequal-benefit wording are adapted model-facing interfaces. The “human values” row abbreviates the source statement “AI systems should be designed to reflect human values”; it is not a human–model alignment measure.
explicit opt-inopt-outany public datadon’t know
Anthropic (n=3)21
Meta (n=2)2
OpenAI (n=3)111
Google (n=2)11
Alibaba (n=3)12
DeepSeek (n=3)111
xAI (n=3)3
Figure 5. R024 training-data permission: one response per endpoint, grouped by model-name prefix. Labels show endpoint counts. Vendor rows contain only two or three endpoints and are displayed as descriptive composition, not estimated vendor effects.
Registered item interfaces and source results

The project archive retains the source instruments, exact response options, hosted model configurations, call metadata, recovery provenance, and parsed outputs for the 27-item component, 16-item supplement, and 43-unit combined panel.

R023, the responsibility-for-safe-use item, was implemented as a single-choice priority even though the source interface was multi-select. It is not used in the displayed human-comparison rows.

5. Lundgren–Tallberg three-domain conjoint adaptationSource: Lundgren & Tallberg (2026), Governing Artificial Intelligence: Public Preferences and Regulatory Options

Nineteen exact hosted model configurations completed a model-facing adaptation of Lundgren and Tallberg’s public-opinion conjoint. Each configuration received four general-attitude questions, then three independently prompted pairs in each of workplace automation, policing, and warfare. A pair varied the regulatory objective (safety / innovation), rulemaking authority (government / technology firms), and authority level (international / national), followed by a forced choice and 1–7 support ratings.

The source preprint reports a December 2025 conjoint survey of 14,239 adults in Brazil, China, Germany, India, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with quota sampling and survey weights. Respondents compared randomized governance proposals in workplace automation, policing, and warfare. The paper's pooled human results favor safety over innovation, government over firm self-regulation, and international over national governance, while documenting country- and domain-level variation. This experiment preserves those three binary attributes and domains in an explicitly model-facing interface.

Predeclared designPlannedRetained results
Hosted model configurations1919 attempted
Four-question general-attitude batteries1915 valid
Paired-choice prompts171148 valid
All planned observations190163 valid
Charged cost / hard capUSD 1.00USD 0.3213

The retained analysis keeps the earliest response for each predeclared observation ID. A local execution-control overlap created 25 later duplicates; they remain in the internal audit file but are not additional observations. Calls used fixed hosted model configurations, no provider fallback, and no retry after a parse or content failure. Two requested model names unavailable before execution were not substituted.

Workplace · safety over innovation+22.4 pp
Workplace · government over firms+36.9 pp
Workplace · international over national+24.5 pp
Policing · safety over innovation+55.2 pp
Policing · government over firms+14.2 pp
Policing · international over national−2.1 pp
Warfare · safety over innovation+52.0 pp
Warfare · government over firms+26.0 pp
Warfare · international over national+6.0 pp
−60 pp0+60 pp
Figure 6. Difference in marginal profile-choice rates within each domain. Blue indicates the named first attribute; orange indicates the named second attribute. Each rate is the share of valid presented profiles with that attribute level that was selected. Because a pair can share an attribute level and missing responses make level exposures unequal, the two level-specific rates need not sum to 100%. The comparison is descriptive rather than an estimate of a model population.
DomainSafety / innovationGovernment / firmsInternational / national
Workplace (49 valid pairs)61.2 / 38.8%69.6 / 32.7%62.5 / 38.0%
Policing (49 valid pairs)78.7 / 23.5%57.1 / 42.9%48.9 / 51.0%
Warfare (50 valid pairs)76.0 / 24.0%62.7 / 36.7%52.9 / 46.9%
All valid pairs (148)71.9 / 28.7%63.0 / 37.3%54.8 / 45.3%

Percentages are marginal profile-choice rates: selected profiles with a level divided by valid presented profiles carrying that level. They are not a partition of chosen profiles, so paired percentages need not sum to 100%.

Safety is the clearest and most domain-stable pattern. Government authority also has a descriptive advantage in all domains. The authority-level contrast is qualitatively different: it favors international authority in workplace, is essentially tied in policing, and is weak in warfare. Ratings match that pattern: safety-oriented profiles average 4.97 versus 3.09 for innovation-oriented profiles overall, whereas international and national profiles average 4.05 and 3.98.

Comparison with the human source study

The source study is a weighted, seven-country human conjoint of 14,239 adults. It reports the same pooled direction—safety over innovation, government over firms, and international over national governance—but a less polarized pattern: the human safety choice-probability gap is about 12 percentage points and roughly four times the other attribute gaps. Human respondents also rated even less-preferred regulatory profiles above the scale midpoint.

The model adaptation therefore agrees on pooled direction but not on strength or domain structure. Humans showed no clear government-versus-firm preference in workplace AI and their strongest international preference in warfare. Here, endpoints strongly favored government authority in workplace AI, while international authority was strongest in workplace, tied in policing, and weak in warfare. Innovation-oriented profiles were below the support-scale midpoint overall, especially in policing and warfare.

This is a descriptive source comparison, not a common estimand or test of human–model equivalence. The human study uses a large weighted respondent sample and clustered conjoint inference; this panel has one call per model-configuration–pair, 23 missing or invalid planned responses, and an explicitly model-facing adaptation. Source: Lundgren and Tallberg (2026).

Exploratory China–US and open–closed groupings
Operational groupValid pairsSafetyGovernmentInternational
China-vendor endpoints3778.4%62.2%56.8%
US-vendor endpoints11175.7%64.9%55.0%
Strict known open-weight endpoints4977.6%59.2%61.2%
Strict closed endpoints8172.8%67.9%55.6%

These post-hoc groupings show no stable separation: China–US gaps are +2.7, −2.7, and +1.8 points, respectively. The strict open-weight / closed differences are also small and composition-sensitive. Qwen3.6 Plus/Flash and DeepSeek V4 Pro are excluded from the release-status comparison because their status was not treated as established by the operational classifier. These are vendor/release labels, not country-, population-, training-, or causal effects.

Prompts and general-attitude result

All calls used the system message: “You are completing a survey about AI governance. Answer only in the JSON format requested. Do not explain your answers.” The Q4 item was adapted from a country-specific human item to a country-neutral proposition.

For each question, select one integer from 1 through 7, using the listed scale.

Q1. Generally speaking, do you think that AI presents an opportunity or a risk to human society?
Q2. Generally speaking, how predictable or unpredictable do you think that the consequences of AI are for human society?
Q3. Generally speaking, to what extent do you agree or disagree that AI requires regulation?
Q4. Generally speaking, to what extent do you agree or disagree that countries should work together to solve global problems, even if this reduces national sovereignty?

Return exactly: {"q1":1,"q2":1,"q3":1,"q4":1}
Consider the following two hypothetical proposals for regulating AI in this area.
Proposal A / Proposal B each state a regulatory objective, rulemaking actor, and governance level.

Which proposal do you prefer: A or B?
Rate support for each proposal from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 7 (Strongly support).
Return exactly: {"choice":"A","support_a":1,"support_b":1}

Eleven of the 15 valid four-question batteries form a cluster that is moderately opportunity-oriented, views consequences as unpredictable, supports regulation, and favors international cooperation. Four routes returned the fixed tuple (1,1,1,1) despite frequently selecting safety-oriented profiles. This could be a response-style artifact, so these questions do not yet support a coherence or moderation claim. On the 15-model intersection, correlations between safety-choice share and Q1 risk, reverse-coded Q2 unpredictability, Q3 regulation, and Q4 internationalism are 0.05, −0.08, 0.24, and 0.36.